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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5049
This paper discusses options to facilitate movement of 
workers between high-income and developing countries 
within the framework of trade agreements, focusing 
on the European Union’s partnership agreements 
with neighboring countries. Existing frameworks for 
cooperation offer the possibility of expanding temporary 
rather than longer-term or permanent movement of 
workers since extant trade agreements provide scope 
for negotiating specific market access commitments for 
services, including those delivered through the cross-
border movement of natural persons. Even though the 
This paper—a product of International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to assess the development implications of regional trade and integration agreements. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at Bhoekman@worldbank.org and Cozden@worldbank.org. 
potential for such “embodied” trade in services will 
not be anywhere near what would be associated with 
substantial liberalization of migration regimes, furthering 
the services trade dimension in the European Union’s 
trade agreements offers significant potential Pareto gains. 
For the partner countries these gains from temporary 
movement of service providers are both direct—through 
greater employment in/revenue from providing services 
in the European Union—and indirect—by helping to 
increase and sustain higher growth at home.  
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: 




The expansion of the European Union (EU) since 2004 has redefined the European 
“neighborhood” to span a diverse group of countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
the Mediterranean and Central Asia. One consequence of the EU expansion was the 
formulation of a new approach by the EU towards these countries – the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). For Mediterranean countries, the ENP complements the 
treaty instruments used since 1995 under the Barcelona Process and the associated Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreements. The basic objectives of the EMP 
agreements are to achieve reciprocal free trade between the EU and Mediterranean 
countries in manufactured goods, improve access for agricultural products; establish 
conditions for gradual liberalization of trade in services and capital and encourage the 
economic integration of partner countries with the EU. These objectives are pursued 
through binding bilateral trade agreements and various forms of development 
cooperation.  
A major innovation of the ENP relative to the status quo ante is that it offers the 
partner countries “a stake” in the EU internal market (Dodini and Fantini, 2006, 
Hoekman, 2005). That is, the partner countries are offered an opportunity to integrate into 
specific elements of existing and evolving EU structures, law and systems on an à la carte 
basis. From an economic perspective these agreements also need to address labor market 
needs on both sides of the Mediterranean in order to maximize the potential welfare gains 
for both the EU and its neighbors. Given current demographic trends, the EU will face a 
severe labor shortage over the next decade while Mediterranean economies will continue 
to experience significant growth in their labor force. These trends will create pressures 
for labor flows into the EU countries, even if high domestic employment growth rates are 
sustained in Mediterranean countries.  
These diverging labor market dynamics provide an opportunity for both the EU and 
partners to complement their economic and institutional integration efforts with a strategy   3
to enhance South-North migration. However, while Europe’s need for foreign workers 
will be growing over the coming decades, political winds across the continent are 
blowing strongly against more migration, and the financial crisis/recession of 2007-09 
has further reduced the prospects for liberalization of movement of people originating 
outside the EU. European policymakers therefore face a daunting challenge of 
reconciling labor market demands with political realities at home.  
This paper discusses an alternative instrument that would facilitate movement of 
workers between the EU and Mediterranean countries within the EMP/ENP framework 
while addressing political concerns in the EU. Existing frameworks for cooperation offer 
the possibility of expanding temporary rather than longer-term or permanent movement 
of workers since EMP agreements provide scope for negotiating specific market access 
commitments for services, including those delivered through the cross-border movement 
of natural persons. Even though the potential for such “embodied” trade in services will 
not be nearly large enough to address the demographic challenges facing either side, 
furthering the services trade dimension in EMP context offers significant potential Pareto 
gains. These gains are both direct – through greater employment in/revenue from 
providing services in the EU – and indirect by helping to increase and sustain higher 
growth in the partner countries.  
 
2. Demographic changes shape labor market reality 
Relative wage differences across countries are the primary determinants of global 
migration patterns (Grogger and Hanson, 2008). These wage gaps can be very high and 
vary over time and by skill level. But overall, the largest relative wage gaps between the 
North and the South are in the unskilled segment of the labor market, reflecting varying 
supply and demand conditions as well as productivity differences. 
In the EU, the demographic outlook of much of Western and Eastern Europe 
suggests that the Union will face severe shortages in labor markets over the next decades.  
The UN forecasts that the population of Europe
1 will decline to 653 million (the medium 
projection) in 2050 from the current level of 728 million (UN, 2009). The size of the 15-
                                                 
1 Europe includes EU25 as well as all Eastern European, (including Russia), Balkan and Nordic countries 
that are not EU members. Turkey is included in Western Asia.    4
59 age group will decline by 0.7% annually during this period, while the 60+ age group 
will increase by 0.9% annually. The dependency ratio will increase from 46.5 to 74.2 in 
2050, when the elderly will form 65% of the dependents, up from 50% in 2005. The 
demographic trends in the newly-acceded countries are no different.  
Meanwhile, developing and least developed countries’ share in world population 
will rapidly increase with the fastest population growth countries being concentrated in 
Africa and the Middle East. The total population of Northern Africa and Western Asia 
(which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Cyprus but excludes Iran) will 
increase from 400 million in 2005 to 700 million in 2050 under the medium projection. 
The size of the 15-64 age group will increase from 250 million to 450 million while the 
60+ age group will grow from 26 to 128 million.  
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 1 presents the current (2005) and projected (2020) population distribution 
in the EU-15 and the three North African countries with significant migration flows to the 
EU – Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The first two bars for each age group represent the 
EU, the second set of bars the average for the three Maghreb countries. The dark bars are 
for 2005, while the lighter bars are 2020 figures projected by the UN. The current 
population in the 0-20 age group is significantly larger in the three Maghreb countries –   5
40% of the current population – whereas they are only 22% of the population of the EU-
15. Over the next 15 years, the UN is projecting a sharp decline in the fertility rates in the 
Maghreb countries. This will result in a decline in the share of the 0-20 age group to 34% 
of the population. In comparison, the sharpest decline in the EU will occur in the 20-40 
age group, which will decline from 28% to 24% of the population. The sharpest increase 
in the three Maghreb countries will take place in the 40-60 group – from 18% to 24%. 
The 20-40 age group – the prime working age cohort, and the one in greatest need of 
employment – will be the largest one in the Maghreb countries in 2020. This is the group 
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Source: Ozden, Sewadeh and Wahba (2009) 
 
 
Occupations with the greatest demand for workers in the EU are reported in 
Figure 2. This shows the number of projected job openings in the EU generated by both 
replacement demand (arising from exit of workers because of retirement and other 
reasons) and expansion demand. Between 2005 and 2016, 61 million jobs are expected to 
become available in the EU25. The largest number of job openings will arise in the EU’s 
major economies: UK, Germany, Italy and France. But smaller economies and EU 
members with lower per capita incomes will also generate an increasing number of jobs   6
over the next few years. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic will together generate 
more than 7 million job openings between 2006 and 2015.  
Figure 3 plots job openings for the five EU members with the highest demand for 
specific occupations. Most of the demand is concentrated in technical/professional 
occupations, services and elementary (unskilled) activities.  Denmark, for example, is 
expected to have over 1.7 million job openings for technicians, second only to Italy. 
Similarly, Poland will have over 1 million job openings for professionals and another 1 
million openings in craft related trades by 2015.  
 
Figure 3 























































































































































































































































































Source: Ozden, Sewadeh and Wahba (2009) 
 
 
Compelling benefits for both sides 
The current demographic trends in the EU and future labor shortages will make migration 
an economic necessity for EU. Moreover, the demographic transformation will place 
significant pressures on social programs in member countries. Admitting more migrant 
workers would help alleviate the pressure on these services at least in the short term. In 
addition, the 60+ age group, which will grow to 28% of the population in 2020, will be   7
the main beneficiaries of migration as they are the main consumers of the services 
provided such as healthcare and household services.  
Significant migration has already been occurring between the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU, driven by the forces discussed previously. Figure 4 presents data on 
the number of migrants in OECD members from the countries in the region. The largest 
source countries are Turkey (close to 2 million as of 2000), Morocco (slightly over 1 
million), Algeria and Iran (around 500,000), and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia 
(around 250,000).
2  Note that the data are plotted on a logarithmic scale, as otherwise the 
large source countries would visually dwarf the smaller countries. All countries have 
experienced an increase in migration during 1990-2000, the overall number of migrants 
increasing by some 40%. However, this includes the children of the migrants who were 
born in the destination countries and who are considered migrants according to the laws 
in most of the EU countries.
3 Smaller countries have experienced more rapid increases in 
migration. The impact of the post-2000 conflicts in the region is not reflected in the data. 
If migration is measured as a share of the native labor force, Lebanese migration 
stands out, at 15% of the native labor force. This reflects decades of political instability 
and a long history of social and economic relations with Europe. Among other high 
outflow countries, Moroccan migration is partly explained by the relatively low cost of 
movement to France and Spain, reflecting historical links and geographic proximity. 
Other high emigration countries include Turkey, Tunisia and Algeria. As mentioned, 
these data underestimate total migration flows, as they do not include the significant 
migration to the Persian Gulf countries from other Arab countries, such as Egypt and 
Jordan. 
 
                                                 
2 The data used in what follows are from Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Their dataset is based on the 
national censuses of the receiving countries, and includes bilateral migration stocks in OECD countries 
from over 170 source countries for the years 1990 and 2000, by three education levels. Data is also 
compiled to allow a comparison of migrants’ educational attainment relative to the native populations. 
Although a major advance, the dataset has several shortcomings. First, it is limited to OECD members as 
destination countries. Thus it ignores several major destination labor markets such as the Persian Gulf, 
Singapore, and South Africa. Second, the dataset only includes employed migrants. Students are not 
captured, even though students, especially in post-graduate programs, are a major source of brain drain. 
3 This is not the case in the US or Canada where the children of migrants receive automatic citizenship if 
they are born in the destination country.   8
Figure 4 
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Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
 
There is substantial variation in the destination of migrants (Figure 5), partially 
reflecting geography and partially historical linkages. For example, the majority of 
migrants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia go to France while Turkish migrants have 
gone to Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Migrants from ex-British colonies such 
as Egypt, Iraq and Jordan often migrate to the UK as well as the other English speaking 
“new world” countries such as the US, Canada and Australia. There is also substantial 
migration to Spain from Morocco and to the UK from the oil-rich countries Gulf   9
countries. Finally, there are a significant number of migrants from Iraq, Iran and Syria in 
Turkey (this is the “missing” portion of each bar in Figure 5). This migration reflects 
geographic proximity and is often a transit stop en route to Europe.
4 
The geographic destination choices for the educated migrants from the region are 
similar to those of total migration overall. Thus, the majority of educated Turkish 
migrants are in Germany, while North African migrants are concentrated in France. 
However, the proportion of migrants with tertiary education going to the US, Canada and 
Australia is much higher for every source country. Only 5% of Turkish and Moroccan 
migrants go to these destinations, as compared to over 25% of all university educated 
Turks and Moroccans who migrate. Reasons for this may include perceptions that 
educated migrants perform better in these labor markets (have more opportunities) and 
may find it easier to be legally and socially accepted.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of migration for developing countries, there are 
growing concerns about “brain drain”. Even though migrants from most developing 
countries are less educated than the native population in destination OECD countries, 
they are more educated than their fellow citizens in their source countries (Docquier and 
Marfouk 2006). There are many reasons for this positive selection effect. Among these 
are the migration policies of the receiving countries that are biased towards educated 
migrants as well as the financial and assimilation constraints faced by unskilled migrants. 
The share of tertiary educated migrants in the total number of migrants increased 
between 1990 and 2000. As of 2000, between 10-15% of migrants from Turkey, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Algeria to the EU have tertiary education. On the other hand, more than 
50% of migrants to OECD countries from other countries in the region, including Egypt, 
Lebanon and Jordan, have tertiary education. One reason for these differences is that 
unskilled migrants from the latter countries have gone to the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
countries. As a result, the figures to the EU capture high levels of educated migrants from 
Persian Gulf countries, as well as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon.  Among the countries in the 
region, Turkish migrants are most similar to the native population in terms of their 
                                                 
4 In considering these data, it is important to recognize that overall migration flows from MENA countries 
are much higher, reflecting the significant numbers of migrants from countries such as Egypt in the GCC 
countries. The EU accounts for about 50% of total cumulative migrant flows out of the region; other 
MENA countries account for another 40%.    10
education profile – around 10% of natives and migrants have tertiary education. 
Similarly, the bias is relatively small for Morocco and Tunisia due to the significant 
number of unskilled migrants.  
The share of the educated population that migrates is of central importance from 
an economic growth perspective since human capital is one of its main determinants. 
Large migrant-sending countries – with the exception of Turkey – and countries 
experiencing conflict are the main victims of brain drain in the Mediterranean region in 
terms of absolute numbers. Poorer countries have low shares of college educated workers 
in the labor force. As a result, even migration of a small number of the skilled might 
imply a significant loss of the existing stock of human capital. On the other hand, for the 
wealthier countries, the total number of migrants relative to the population is much 
smaller and a smaller portion of the highly educated chooses to migrate – hence the lower 
levels for these countries.  
 
 








































































































































A neglected factor in the literature on the brain drain is where the migrants obtain 
their education. In the case of the EU, a large portion of those people considered migrants 
actually received or completed their education in the destination countries after they 
either migrated as children with their families or migrated as young adults to complete 
their education and stayed to enter the labor force. In the case of France, only around   11
30% of Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian educated migrants arrived after the age of 22 
(Figure 6). Around 60% arrived in France before age 18, indicating they came as children 
and grew up there. Similarly, 40% of Turkish and Lebanese migrants – the other two 
large groups – also arrived as children. Thus, a large number of educated migrants in 
France have not consumed fiscal resources of their native countries for their education. 
 
3. Reconciling economic needs with the political reality 
While the economic reality in the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors is creating 
medium to long-term pressures for increased migration, the political winds across Europe 
are blowing strongly in favor of stemming the flow of immigrants into the continent. The 
current stock of Middle Eastern migrants contributed to rising resistance to migration 
according to public opinion surveys and political debates. The increase in negative views 
is the outcome of a mix of security, cultural and more recently economic concerns 
Evidence provided by Mayda (2005) suggests that cultural assimilation and 
security/crime concerns are relatively more important in shaping attitudes than labor 
market variables. The opinion surveys
5 reveal seemingly conflicting attitudes toward 
migration and the economic interests of respondents. For example, older people tend to 
be more anti-immigration even though they are the ones likely to benefit the most from 
migrants whether via increased supply of domestic and health service providers or lower 
dependency ratios. The growing hostility towards immigrants has made the political 
environment in many EU countries much less welcoming of immigrants. Ironically, the 
increased restrictions on immigration have not done much to stem the flow of 
immigrants. Instead it has lead to an increase in illegal entry, with a consequent change in 
the composition of migration towards less educated people (Boeri and Bruckner 2005). 
6  
Resistance to further migration amidst the rising demand for workers in the EU 
suggests that policy makers should consider alternative mechanisms that can partially 
substitute for permanent movement of workers across borders while at the same time 
encourage more two-way flows. In this context, a temporary movement scheme might be 
seen as less “threatening.” In a recent EU consultation on development and in response to 
                                                 
5 Among these are the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Program and others. 
6 See also Kessler and Freeman (2005) and Mayda (2004) for analyses of the determinants of European 
attitudes to migration.   12
a question about the objective of EU migration policy, 56% of respondents said migration 
should benefit source countries, 38% worried about negative effects of brain drain, and 
27% thought that temporary movement possibilities needed to be enhanced.
7 While the 
views expressed by respondents to the survey may not reflect the beliefs of the EU public 
at large, they do suggest it may be possible to find support for effective temporary labor 
movement schemes. 
A temporary migration program has many advantages. First, temporary labor 
inflows will have little impact on the demographic profile of the EU, thus easing political 
resistance while partially addressing labor market needs. Second, it would be consistent 
with the temporary nature of the excess supply of labor in Mediterranean countries.  As 
noted previously, the demographic profiles in these countries are such that, in the next 20 
years or so they will experience a reduction in the supply of workers. Third, temporary 
migration flows are likely to reduce brain drain losses for source countries, while still 
generating significant remittance flows.
8 Fourth, returnees help raise productivity in 
home countries since they bring back newly acquired human and physical capital. Fifth 
the incentives for undocumented migration by facilitating legal and recurrent cross-
border movement of workers are reduced.   
The aggregate potential gains associated with liberalization of temporary 
movement can be significant. Walmsley and Winters (2005) analyze the potential global 
welfare gains associated with a relaxation of barriers to temporary movement of workers 
and conclude that aggregate gains to the world can easily exceed the complete 
elimination of remaining barriers to trade in goods. Tani (2005) analyzes the potential 
growth effects of temporary movement of people, focusing specifically on business 
travelers, and finds that such movement is positively correlated with economic growth. 
9  
                                                 
7 EU Public Consultation Report, 2005: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/consultation/doc/Stat_IPM_EN.pdf. 
8 In principle remittances associated with temporary movement may be higher than that associated with 
longer-term movement, as links with source country household members are likely to be much stronger. 
More generally, however, Philippe Fargues has argued that as migration comes to involve younger workers 
who are not encumbered by families and have less need to take care of extended families that remain in 
source countries, the relative importance of remittances will decline. Instead, income earned will be 
devoted more to consumption and investment in the human capital of the migrants themselves.   
9 Note that migration – temporary or permanent – is not a solution to the fiscal pressures created by an 
aging population. This will require changes in the level of social benefits and the way they are financed. An 
example is shifting from defined benefit pension programs to defined contribution based schemes.   13
The obvious challenge is to ensure that temporary movement is indeed temporary. 
A common view of many EU voters and policymakers – based on past experience – is 
that nothing is more permanent than a temporary “guest” worker. This widely held view 
is a major factor impeding any serious effort to negotiate and put in place effective 
temporary movement schemes that would substantially enhance access to the EU market. 
These concerns are well-founded, as incentives for both employers and temporary 
entrants to ensure temporariness can be rather weak.  
Amin and Mattoo (2005) analyze the incentives for host and source countries to 
prefer temporary to long-term or permanent migration. They show that unilateral 
migration policies are globally inefficient in that they lead to excessive permanent 
migration relative to temporary movement, and too little overall movement of workers. 
Their analysis suggests that the challenge is to design self-enforcing cooperation 
agreements that make temporary entry feasible (desirable) ex post. This could be done by 
increasing the cost to host firms to retain workers by taxing them or by requiring them to 
deposit lump-sum payments into an escrow account that is refunded on return of workers, 
and by increasing worker’s incentives to return by refunding social security taxes (see 
e.g., Martin, 2006; Schiff, 2004; Holzmann and Münz, 2004).  
Chaudhuri, Mattoo and Self (2004) and Winters et al. (2003) identify a number of 
desirable components of trade agreements covering Mode 4. A central element is that the 
focus should be on “contract-based” movement of service suppliers, not employment-
based movement (and associated visas/work permits). Contract-based movement focuses 
not on people (workers or individuals) but on tasks (services) that have been contracted 
by a firm in the EU. Examples would be medical or home care services. The EU has 
demonstrated a willingness to consider reciprocal negotiations on such movement in the 
WTO context (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). As discussed below, 
the EU has begun to move down this track in recent agreements with Chile and the 2008 
Economic Partnership Agreement with the Caribbean. 
Suppose there is a specific demand for certain services by a firm or government 
entity in the EU, and that these services are covered by the agreement so that they may be 
provided by either EU or partner-based firms. A firm that obtains (wins) a contract would 
                                                                                                                                                 
   14
be free to source the required inputs from EU or providers at home. If they choose the 
latter, the service providers (workers) would be granted a visa/permit for a limited period 
to be negotiated. These workers would be employees of the Mediterranean firm, although 
they might also be employed by an affiliate of an EU firm that has established in the 
partner country. Indeed, the affiliate may be connected to the EU firm that is buying or 
supplying the services (in this case the sub-contracting of service inputs would be in-
house, not arms-length).
10 The advantage of contract-based movement as opposed to 
employment-based movement is that it helps to make temporariness more credible as 
contracts are time-bound. Although the contracts may be recurrent, once the worker 
reaches the maximum length of stay, he/she must be rotated.  
Contract-based movement also allows internalization of some objectives that 
otherwise require regulation. For example, a common constraint on international trade in 
services is non-recognition of licenses and professional qualifications. Rather than 
require re-certification or the negotiation of (mutual) recognition agreements – a 
cumbersome and time consuming process because the focus of attention is on national 
conditions, laws and institutions – a contract-based approach leaves it to the buying firm 
or entity to establish whether foreign suppliers satisfy prevailing quality and related 
performance standards. Contract-based approaches can also more easily be designed to 
generate incentives to encourage workers to return. As the contracts are between firms, 
the government can hold them accountable for performance, further helping to internalize 
incentives. 
An explicit focus on expanding the scope for cross-border movement of service 
providers can provide a framework for cooperation on policies that are needed to 
maximize the joint benefits of such trade. A major negative dimension of current 
restrictive migration regimes is that they encourage illegal movement, with its associated 
risks, costs, uncertainty, and potential exploitation of migrants by intermediaries and 
employers. But legal movement is also affected by uncertainty and problems of 
                                                 
10 There is some experience with such types of schemes. Winters et al. (2003) note that in the early 1990s 
Germany used sub-contracting agreements to attract foreign labor on a temporary basis. Under this 
arrangement a Central European firm would contract to provide specific services for a German firm on a 
sub-contracting basis. These were subject to government approval, and required satisfaction of wage parity 
conditions and acceptable working conditions. The German firm was liable for noncompliance of the 
foreign sub-contractors (through fines), and noncomplying foreign firms could be blacklisted. This scheme 
was subject to a countrywide quota of 100,000 foreign workers, as well as industry-specific caps.   15
asymmetric information, ex post contract enforcement, excess costs of repatriation of 
savings, and so forth. Migrants may confront discrimination and be denied basic rights. 
These factors can give rise to selection bias and serious mismatches between the skills 
required for jobs and the qualifications/capacity of the migrants (Amin and Mattoo, 
2006).  
Mode 4 agreements can be used as a focal point for reforms in complementary 
policies in both host and home countries to address many of these well known problems. 
For example, if mode 4 type movement is contract-based, problems of skill mismatch are 
less likely to occur as the firms involved have incentives not to “under employ” workers 
– more educated service providers are less likely to be forced to drive taxis, for example, 
as is currently too often the case in some OECD countries. On a sector-by-sector basis, 
they can allow a focus on improving educational policies in source countries so as to 
make graduates of programs fit better the needs of the market – in the EU and at home – 
while increasing the EU share of financing for this educational investment, as part of it 
benefits consumers in the EU. They can also help move Mediterranean countries in the 
direction of emulating policies of the type that have been pursued by successful 
temporary emigration countries such as the Philippines (Wahba, 2006). This includes 
contracts that bind workers and employers/recruiters and that specify the rights of 
workers. These are enforceable under Philippine law. The Philippine government also 
provides a variety of complementary inputs and products, including briefing workers on 
the social and work conditions in the host country, life insurance and pension plans, 
medical coverage and access to credit. As stressed by Wahba (2006), Mediterranean 
countries have not pursued such policies to support outward temporary migration. A 
contract-based services approach can constitute a coordination mechanism to put in place 
such supporting policies, especially if complemented by development assistance 
(technical and financial) from the EU. 
 
4. Euro-Med services trade liberalization: A partial solution 
Despite the rather extensive development cooperation programs and the implementation 
of bilateral free trade agreements, economic growth in many Mediterranean countries has 
not generated enough jobs to absorb the younger generations entering the labor force.   16
This is mostly due to the pace and depth of economic reforms. It is also partially an 
outcome of important holes in the edifice of the EU’s trade agreements. For example, it 
makes no sense from an economic perspective to limit international cooperation (trade 
agreements) to products and capital flows (investment). A concerted effort to increase the 
potential for regional services trade could both generate greater employment for workers 
in service sectors both in partner countries and in the EU, and improve economic policies 
in the Mediterranean countries.`  
Trade in many services requires provider and consumer to be located in the same 
place, implying that either provider or the consumer needs to move to the other’s 
location. Thus, by definition, liberalization of trade in services will often lead to 
movement of people. They may be managers of affiliates of multinational firms that 
establish in a foreign market to supply services locally, employees of foreign firms or 
independent contractors who move temporarily across borders to provide a service to 
clients, or consumers who travel to the location of a service provider. The latter “mode” 
of trade comprises activities such as tourism, education, and medical services.  
 
Current status of Euro-Med partnership agreements 
As part of the Euro-Med partnership, the EU has concluded seven Association 
Agreements between 1998 and 2005 with Algeria, Egypt Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, and Tunisia.  As mentioned earlier, the agreements provide a framework for 
commitments on trade in goods and services between the EU and these countries.  They 
also aim to provide a basis for gradual liberalization of trade in the Mediterranean area 
and set out general conditions for economic, social and cultural cooperation between the 
EU and those countries.  
  With relation to labor mobility, most of these agreements only reaffirm each 
Party's obligations under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Some of the agreements provide for a dialogue between parties to “achieve progress” 
with relation to movement of workers. The EU Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia 
also include commitments on non-discrimination with respect to working conditions, 
remuneration dismissal and social security for nationals of these countries that are legally 
employed in the EU. Both agreements also call for “regular dialogue” on the living and   17
working conditions of migrant communities; migration in general (not only with 
connection to services) and illegal immigration.  
  The EU Agreements with Algeria and Jordan provide for limited movement of 
key personnel. Jordanian companies established in the EU may employ Jordanian 
nationals that are “key personnel”, defined as “persons working in a senior position 
within an organization” or “persons working within an organization who possess 
uncommon knowledge essential to the establishment’s service.”  The EU agreement with 
Israel does not include specific commitments on labor movement. The Parties only agree 
to cooperate on preventing and increasing the effectiveness of measures aimed at curbing 
illegal migration.    
 
Other EU trade agreements 
The 2000 EU-Mexico FTA contains provisions on movement of natural persons in 
connection with supply of financial services only. Negotiations on services were to take 
place within three years of the entry into force of the FTA, but to date no agreements 
have been reached. A noteworthy element of the EU-Mexico Agreement is the linkage 
between GATS Mode 3 (commercial presence) and GATS Mode 4 (temporary movement 
of natural persons supplying services): Parties may not require that managerial or other 
key personnel be of a particular nationality, or that more than a simple majority of boards 
of directors of financial service suppliers of the other Party be composed of nationals 
and/or residents of the host country.   
The 2002 EU-Chile Association Agreement covers services and contains 
provisions on the temporary movement of service suppliers. Unlike the EU-Mexico FTA, 
the agreement provides for movement of three categories of service suppliers in a large 
number of services sub-sectors. Article 99 of the Agreement provides for movement of (i) 
intra-corporate transferees, (ii) business service sellers and, for the first time in a bilateral 
agreement, (iii) contractual service suppliers operating in some 30 service sectors.
 11 The 
                                                 
11 The covered sectors are legal; accounting; auditing; tax advisory; architectural, urban planning and 
landscape design services; engineering; medical, dental, midwife, veterinary, nursing, physiotherapy and 
paramedical services; computer and related services; research and development services; advertising; 
market research and opinion polling; management consulting and services related to management 
consulting; technical testing and analysis services; related scientific and consulting services; advisory and 
consulting services in the fields of agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing, and mining; maintenance and   18
entry and stay of such contractual service suppliers is subject to duration of stay 
restrictions in the EU (6 months), limits on the overall length of service contracts and 
constraints on how contracts can be obtained. The agreement only applies to movement 
of (highly) skilled persons.  The conditions and restrictions applying to movement of 
natural persons are similar those maintained by the EU under the GATS. 
The 2008 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the CARIFORUM 
countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) and has the 
broadest coverage of labor mobility of any agreement between the EU and developing 
countries. 
Five categories of natural service suppliers are covered: (i) key personnel 
(including business visitors and intra-corporate transferees); (ii) graduate trainees; (iii) 
business service sellers; (iv) contractual service suppliers; and (v) independent 
professionals. Movement of natural persons from the first three groups is not linked to the 
supply of services, but movement of contractual service suppliers and independent 
professionals is allowed only in connection to supply of specific services. CARIFORUM 
companies with contracts to provide services in any of 29 sectors covered by the 
agreement may send their employees to the EU to provide these services for up to six 
months at a time. Similar provisions apply to skilled self-employed service suppliers for a 
much smaller number of activities (eleven) (e.g. computer services, management 
consulting).
12 None of the included services are ones where developing countries have a 
                                                                                                                                                 
repair of equipment; photographic services; convention services; translation services; construction services 
and site investigation work; environmental services; higher education services; adult education services; 
Travel agencies and tour operator services; tour guide services; entertainment services; news agency 
services; and services related to the sale of equipment or to the assignment of a patent. 
 
12The covered sectors for contractual services are legal; accounting; tax advisory; architectural, urban 
planning and landscape design services; engineering; medical, dental, midwife, veterinary, nursing, 
physiotherapy and paramedical services; computer and related services; research and development 
services; advertising; market research and opinion polling; management consulting and services related to 
management consulting; technical testing and analysis services; related scientific and consulting services; 
maintenance and repair of equipment; chef de cuisine and fashion model services; translation services; site 
investigation work; environmental services; private higher education services; travel agencies and tour 
operator services; tour guide services; entertainment services. 
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strong (potential) comparative advantage. EU and national working conditions apply, 
including minimum wage requirements, collective wage agreements and licensing 
requirements. 
Specific criteria must be satisfied before contractual services suppliers or 
independent professionals can apply for entry into the EU, including the following.
13 
  Contractual suppliers must be employees of the juridical person supplying the 
services for at least one year immediately preceding the date of submission of an 
application for entry. They must have at least three years professional experience 
in the sector of activity concerned; 
  Suppliers must possess (i) a university degree or a qualification demonstrating an 
equivalent level of knowledge and (ii) the professional qualifications required by 
law or regulation to exercise an activity in an EU Member;   
  The temporary entry and stay is limited to a cumulative period of not more than 
six months in any 12-month period or for the duration of the contract, whichever 
is less. 
In addition to these conditions, a significant number of Member States have 
maintained the right to apply economic needs tests and to limit the scope of intra-
corporate transferees, directors or auditors. For example, 16 of the EU-25 have indicated 
that they will apply such a test in the case of medical and dental services, 21 member 
states did so for veterinary services, and 22 apply a test in the case of provision of nursing 
services. 
The EPA is the only EU agreement to date to include firm commitments on 
movement of contractual service suppliers and independent professionals. However, it 
does not include disciplines on regulatory conditions or requirements and does not 
include mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications. The criteria 
relating to educational attainment and the continued application of economic needs tests, 
                                                                                                                                                 
The sectors that are open to self-employed providers are: legal advisory services in respect of international 
public law and foreign law (i.e. non-EU law); architectural services; urban planning and landscape 
architecture services; engineering services; integrated engineering services; computer and related services; 
research and development services; market research and opinion polling; management consulting and 
services related to management consulting; and translation and interpretation. 
 
13 These conditions apply to service suppliers from both parties   20
limit the extent of liberalization. Very few of the covered sectors involve activities in 
which Mediterranean countries have a comparative advantage, reducing the scope for 
agreements along the lines of the EPA to help address demographic pressures in a 
significant way in the coming decades. The problem is not the bias against independent 
professionals relative to contracts obtained by service companies in CARIFORUM 
countries, as this is consistent with what economic analysis suggests is a necessary 
condition for making temporariness operationally feasible (incentive compatible). It is the 
limited sectoral coverage and the rather open-ended acceptance of economic needs tests 
that is the major factor limiting the potential for large joint gains. 
 
Improving on the EPA 
At just noted, the EPA with the CARIFORUM constitutes progress relative to the 
EMP/ENP, by including specific commitments on mode 4 liberalization. The EPA and 
the agreement with Chile illustrate both the potential that exists for exploiting trade 
agreements to facilitate movement of services providers and the challenges confronting 
EU neighboring countries in negotiating meaningful access to the EU market. These 
agreements show that progress on mode 4 can be made, but that for this to be meaningful 
it is important to minimize the restrictions and uncertainty that is implied by EU member 
states maintaining economic needs tests and limiting liberalization to high-skill activities. 
Both the Chile agreement and the EPA also demonstrate that negotiations with the EU 
will have to be sector-specific as opposed to horizontal or across-the-board. This suggests 
that it will be important to build coalitions with EU firms operating in specific sectors 
that confront serious worker shortages, as well as with government entities and 
enterprises that have an interest in both expanding the supply of services in specific areas 
and reducing the costs of service provision. Rather than accept open-ended economic 
needs tests and the associated uncertainty, a better approach might be to focus on putting 
place effective safeguard instruments that can be invoked if imports of services grow “too 
fast” following liberalization.   
  Harnessing support inside the EU for liberalization in specific tasks/sectors that 
are of interest to EU constituencies is a necessary condition for putting less highly skill 
intensive services on the negotiating table. Moving down the skill gradient is critical both   21
for there to be more significant gains for Mediterranean and other neighboring economies 
and for the EU. It will also be necessary to negotiate longer duration of stay provisions, 
as the 6 month limit is likely to be too short to allow the needed training and other start-
up/fixed costs to be recouped. Either a longer period is required, or relaxation of the 12 
month overall constraint. In practice a number of revolving (recurrent) 6 months stays 
that are interspersed with a periodic return to the home country (of say 3 months) will 
achieve both the temporariness constraint, allow workers to maintain a strong link with 
the families and allow fixed costs of training etc. to be recovered over a longer period of 
time.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Movement of people is a positive sum gain for both the EU and neighboring countries. 
Both have political and economic reasons to prefer more temporary movement in 
addition to permanent migration. The economic rationales are particularly compelling 
from the perspective of source countries, given lower brain drain losses and the 
temporary nature of the demographic bulge of young workers that are entering the labor 
market. The problem is that the policy debate and bilateral cooperation tends to be 
focused primarily on control of (illegal) migration and not on the appropriate design of 
temporary movement policies.  
Migration must be part of the longer-term response to the demographic trends in 
the EU countries. However, it is also clear that many EU citizens do not support a policy 
that leads to significant further opening of the European labor markets to foreign workers. 
Prospects for liberalization of migration flows in the short to medium run seem low, 
especially in light of the recent accessions to the EU. Therefore, negotiating additional 
temporary entry opportunities for service providers through the vehicle of EMP/ENP 
trade agreements is an option that can be implemented now. While such trade agreements 
have inherent limitations in that access must be restricted to services, much of the 
demand for workers is in fact in service activities. 
That said, negotiating additional temporary access is clearly not a panacea. The 
potential for a significant expansion of access to service jobs through mode 4 is limited. 
One reason for this is that the EU is not (yet) a customs union when it comes to services   22
policies, implying that national policies cannot be ignored. This has also been a factor 
impeding progress in liberalizing mode 4 trade in the ASEAN context (Bhatnagar and 
Manning, 2005).  
To make temporariness credible, specific measures need to be put in place that 
address the incentives of EU firms and MENA workers to resist the turnover costs 
associated with regular mobility. An effective expansion of temporary movement of 
people supplying services will imply lower entry costs and may reduce adverse selection 
effects for jobs that can be provided on a temporary but rolling basis.  There will be extra 
costs for firms associated with transport and recurrent training. To make temporariness 
feasible is also likely to require financial transfers in addition to more access to EU 
markets. One reason is to induce South Mediterranean countries to manage illegal 
migration pressures, including transit migrants. Against this there is a presumptive 
“social” payoff of not having lower skilled people move permanently – something that 
appears to be becoming part of the objective function of many governments in Europe. 
Less ambiguous are the likely economic payoffs to the exporting countries – an income 
flow/remittance transfer and a brain drain reduction benefit associated with temporary 
movement. Finally, it is important to note that the diverging demographic trends are 
relatively short term, spanning only the next 20 years or so. Therefore the opportunity to 
take advantage of demographic differences to ease social and economic pressures will not 
be there for very long.  
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